道德運氣與道德責任問題
【內容提要】根據直到康德才得以完全確立的傳統(tǒng)道德責任觀念，一個人必須要為之負責任的事情只是那
種直接依從他的意志作用力而完成的行為，而獨立于意志的任何東西一直被認為是與道德特性的歸屬毫無
關系的，這在不同的意義上既符合、也悖于道德直觀。然而，如果道德運氣是一個實在的道德概念，那么
，傳統(tǒng)的道德責任觀念就必須加以修正，因為我們也應該為那種超越于人的控制能力（此根植于意志）的
事情負責。盡管如此，與首次嚴肅地將道德運氣概念引入當代道德理論論域的伯納德·威廉姆斯不同，本
文認為，對于所謂“超越”必須有某些限制，而且這些限制可歸結為本文所說的“道德關聯(lián)”也即與康德
式的意愿性行為的關聯(lián)，這種意愿性行為在本文中具體表現(xiàn)為行為者的過錯。這樣，道德運氣概念就有理
由繼續(xù)維系于康德式的道德責任觀念，至少應該與后者保持某種連續(xù)性。
【關鍵詞】道德運氣 道德責任 意愿性行為 行為者遺憾 正當性證明
Abstract: According to the traditional conception of moral responsibility, which up to Kant
had been established completely, what a person must be responsible for is nothing more than
what is done directly from her or his agency, whereas anything that is independent of the
will has been regarded as irrelevant to the ascription of moral status. This seems to be
both compatible and incompatible with moral intuition in different senses. If moral luck is
a real concept of morality, the conception has to be revised to the extent that we should be
held responsible for what is beyond the controlling capability grounded in the will.
Nevertheless, unlike Bernard Williams who first seriously introduced the concept of moral
luck into the contemporary realm of moral theory, the present paper maintains that there
must be some li
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